In Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elections Commission (2019AP272), the Court of Appeals District IV held that parties reviewing voting software during a recount may disclose opinions based on review of the software.

Wis. Stat. § 5.905(4) provides that if there is a recount in a state election, a party may review software components used to record votes in the election. The statute requires the Wisconsin Election Commission to grant access to software components if the party enters into a confidentiality agreement.

In 2016, the Jill Stein Campaign requested review of the Election Systems & Software, LLC’s electronic voting system used in the November 2016 election. Allowing the campaign to review the system pursuant to § 5.905(4), the Commission provided a confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement that required the campaign to maintain the confidentiality of “all proprietary information.” The Commission did not specifically prohibit the campaign from publicly disclosing any opinions based on review of the Election Systems software.

In this case, Election Systems argued the Commission’s confidentiality agreement was not broad enough to satisfy the confidentiality requirement of § 5.905(4). According to Election Systems, the Commission should have prohibited the campaign from disclosing any comments or opinions derived from the campaign’s review of the voting software.

The appeals court disagreed with Elections System, finding that the plain language of § 5.905(4) does not prohibit reviewing parties from disclosing opinions based on review of voting software. Instead, the statute simply requires maintaining confidentiality of “proprietary information” (i.e., the actual software components). The Commission was not required to expand on the statutory language in its confidentiality agreement with the campaign to prohibit disclosure of opinions based on review of those software components. Furthermore, the court found that the campaign’s disclosure of opinions on the software components was not an unauthorized use of Election Systems’s trade secrets.

In Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2019AP1182), the Court of Appeals District III held that the plaintiff’s injury occurred after the expiration of the insurer’s policy period, so there was no coverage for the plaintiff’s claims.

The Thompsons were visiting a home in Weyerhauser, Wis., in July 2016 when a deck railing collapsed and Richard Thompson fell off the deck. Previous homeowners William and Susan Carroll had built the deck. Seeking compensation for Richard’s injury, the Thompsons sued various persons, including the Carrolls and their homeowners insurer for the Weyerhauser house, Wilson Mutual. The Carrolls’ policies with Wilson mutual expired in August 2013, a few months after they sold the house.

The Wilson Mutual policy provided coverage for liability of the insured “because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence,” defining “occurrence” as “an accident…that results in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ during the policy period.” The policy further states that “This policy only covers losses, ‘bodily injury,’ and ‘property damage’ that occur during the policy period.”

The court found that Wilson Mutual did not cover the Thompsons’ claims because the “occurrence” of “bodily injury” to Richard Thompson occurred in 2016, after the expiration of the Wilson Mutual policy period in 2013.

In Welter v. LIRC (2018AP1940), the Court of Appeals District III held that the plaintiff’s surgery was not compensable under Worker’s Compensation because her workplace injury had healed before the surgery.

Plaintiff Susan Welter served as a school bus monitor for Student Transit – Eau Claire. Welter had a knee replacement in 2003. In 2013, she experienced some knee pain but declined to undergo a second knee replacement at that time. In 2014, she slipped and fell on ice at work, and doctors said the work injury could have exacerbated her preexisting knee condition. Welter had a second knee replacement surgery in March 2014. Welter’s doctor said that the workplace injury caused her to undergo the knee replacement earlier than she would have had to otherwise.

A doctor hired by Student Transit opined that the injury caused by the workplace accident had healed by February 2014. The need for knee replacement was not caused by the slip and fall. In fact, the knee replacement had been recommended in 2013, before the fall.

Welter and Student Transit entered into an agreement on most of Welter’s Worker’s Compensation claims, but Welter later filed a Worker’s Compensation claim for medical expenses for costs related to her second knee replacement.

The Labor and Industry Review Commission agreed with Student Transit’s doctor that the workplace injury had healed before Welter’s second knee replacement surgery, so the surgery was not compensable under Worker’s Compensation. The appeals court found there was credible and substantial evidence in the doctor’s testimony to support the Commission’s finding. Therefore, Student Transit and its insurer were not liable for medical expenses related to Welter’s knee replacement surgery.