In a 4-3 decision crossing ideological lines, the Supreme Court ruled that wine grantor-dealer relationships are not considered “dealerships” under Wisconsin’s Fair Dealership Law.

The decision answers a certified question from a U.S. Court of Appeals that will ultimately decide whether Winebow violated the Fair Dealership Law in unilaterally terminating its relationships with distributors Capitol Husting and L’Eft Bank Wine Co.

The Fair Dealership Law defines “dealership” in Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3)(b) as an agreement by which a “wholesaler” is granted the right sell, distribute, or use a commercial symbol related to “intoxicating liquor.”

Writing for the majority, Justice Gableman (joined by fellow conservatives Justice Ziegler and Chief Justice Roggensack and liberal Justice Walsh Bradley) argued wine grantor-dealer relationships do not fall under the definition of “dealership” because a definition of “intoxicating liquor” later in Ch. 135 explicitly excludes wine. The majority backs its position with an examination of the legislative history and intent of the statute, pointing to Gov. Tommy Thompson’s partial veto that deleted cross-references to the definition of “intoxicating liquor” that does include wine. Furthermore, the majority states that the definition that excludes wine is the only definition of “intoxicating liquor” present in Ch. 135, and courts should aim to use a uniform definition of a single term throughout a chapter.

In the dissent, conservative Justice R. Bradley (joined by conservative Justice Kelly and liberal Justice Abrahamson) sides with the distributors in that wine grantor-dealer relationships should be included in the definition of “dealership” under the Fair Dealership Law. The dissent states that the phrase “In this chapter” in Wis. Stat. § 135.02 is evidence the definition of “dealership” in § 135.02(3)(b) governs the entire chapter. Instead of focusing on the definition of “intoxicating liquor” later in Ch. 135 that excludes wine, the dissent focuses on the definition of “wholesaler” in § 135.02(3)(b) that, when cross-referenced, does include wine. The dissent criticizes the majority for focusing on legislative intent rather than the explicit statutory language.